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ARTICLES
ENTERPRISE SYSTEMS
AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
PARALLEL AND INTERCONNECTED
EVOLUTION
THEMISTOKLES LAZARIDES*
MARIA ARGYROPOULOU**
DIMITRIOS KOUFOPOULOS***
INTRODUCTION
Today’s business requirements have moved Enterprise Systems
(“ES”) governance into the focus of attention as they are necessary in
supporting business processes in many organizations. Corporate Governance (“CG”) and ES constitute two seemingly dissimilar research areas
that attract the interest of completely different academics as well as
practitioners. However, at a time when there is an increasing focus on
CG practices and the impact of ES on corporate performance, these topics are tightly connected and complimentary. Given the fact that ES can
contribute positively in achieving business objectives, it is imperative to
discuss the relationship of CG and information technology (“IT”). Moreover, we argue that good CG depends on effective management and integrity of information within an organization. This shift is being accelerated
and influenced by the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002
in the United States (“U.S.”) and the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (“OECD”)1 principles in Europe.
* Corresponding author Tel.: +302462087691; Fax: +302462087691. E-mail address:
tlazarides@teikoz.gr. Department of Applied Informatics in Administration and Economy,
Technological Institute of West Macedonia, GR- 51100, Grevena, Greece.
** Brunel Business School, Brunel University London/UK.
*** Brunel Business School, Brunel University London/UK.
1. OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, OECD (Paris 2004), available at http://
www.oecd.org/dataoecd32/18/31557724.pdf [hereinafter OECD Principles].
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CG AND THE USE OF ES
CG is defined as the structure and processes among directors within
the board of directors, shareholders, top management, and other stakeholders that involves the objectives of assuring accountability and improving performance.2 Gillan and Starks define CG as the system of
laws, rules, and factors that control operations in a company.3 Shleifer
and Vishny adopt a more financial point of view and argue that “CG
deals with the way suppliers (principals) of finance assure themselves of
getting a return on their investment.”4 Finally, Monks explains that CG
is a process of effective accountability of management to informed and
active owners.5
Within the CG literature, an issue of great importance concerns
agency theory and is based on the premise that there is an inherent conflict between the interests of a firm’s owners and its management.6 In
line with agency theory, the central problem of CG is determining how
shareholders ensure that self-seeking executives (agents) act in the
shareholders’ (principals) interests rather than in their own.7
Agency theory is concerned with aligning the interests of owners and
managers and addresses the issues that may arise when owners (principals) relinquish control of the firm to managers (agents) that are hired to
administer the firm’s activities.8 This separation of ownership from con2. ALEX DUNLOP, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CONTROL: (CIMA Publishing 1998);
ELAINE STERNBERG, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE MARKETPLACE, 10
(The Institute of Economic Affairs, 2d ed. 2004), available at http://www.iea.org.uk/files/
upld-book227pdf?.pdf; R. IAN TRICKER, INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: TEXT,
READINGS AND CASES 265(Prentice Hall 1994).
3. Stuart L. Gillan and Laura T. Starks, A Survey of Shareholder Activism: Motivation and Empirical Evidence, 2 CONTEMP. FIN. DIG. 10-34 (1998).
4. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, LII J. OF
FIN. 737, 738 (1997), available at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/
APCITY/UNPAN018934.pdf.
5. Robert A. G. Monks, Equity Culture at Risk, 11 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L REV.
164 (2003).
6. Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26
J. OF L. & ECON. 301-25 (1983), available at http://www.business.uiuc.edu/~shelley1/readings/seponrshpctrl.pdf; Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review, 14 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 57-74 (1989), available at http://pcbfaculty.ou.edu/classfiles/
MGT%206293%20Strategic%20Management/Week%202%20Grab%20Bag%20of%20Theoretical%20Perspectives/eisenhardt%2089%20amr%20gov%20agency%20review.pdf.
7. J. Hendry, Beyond Self – Interest: Agency Theory and the Board in a Satisfying
World, 16 BRIT. J. OF MGMT. 60 (2005).
8. Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. OF POL. ECON.
288-307 (1980), available at http://astro.temple.edu/~tub06197/Wk5FamaAgencyProblems
andthetheoryofthefirm.pdf; Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. OF FIN. ECON. 305-60
(1976), available at http://venus.unive.it/pelizzon/Jensen&Meckling.pdf; Miron Stano, Mo-
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trol is potentially problematic as principals and agents may have different sets of goals, and agents typically possess far more information than
principals about both the firm and their own activities. This imbalance
in the distribution of information between principals and agents is referred to as information asymmetry.9 Agents may maintain their dominant position using their competitive advantage of information within
the company over that of the owners. The principals are not able to monitor, to exert control, or, if necessary, to discipline managers who have
goals or take actions not aligned with theirs.10 Information asymmetry is
a vitally important concept in the logic of agency theory, as agency
problems are unlikely to occur when information is equally distributed
because principals are able to directly monitor agent behavior and thus
prevent agents from acting opportunistically.11 In order to prevent
agency problems, principals may design and implement contracts designed to align the interests of principals and agents, or principals may
take steps to reduce information asymmetry by increasing the amount of
information they possess.12
Managers may control the information flow because all information
is forwarded to them and then disseminated to the Board of Directors
(“BoD”), shareholders, and at the General Shareholders’ Meeting. That
leaves these groups without any direct access to the ES database. Furthermore, some other interested parties, such as potential investors and
other stakeholders, are left out of the informational loop. The adoption
and effective implementation of ES can alleviate the problem of information asymmetry by providing to the board the necessary information they
need to possess in order to protect the interests of shareholders. This is
because modern ES can provide the technological means for capturing,
processing, disseminating, and analyzing information across the
enterprise.13
ES can influence corporate performance, especially due to the integration of business processes and the ensuing information sharing along
the company value chain.14 The ESs or any other information systems
nopoly Power, Ownership Control, and Corporate Performance, 7 BELL J. OF ECON. 672-79
(1976).
9. Eisenhardt, supra note 6, at 57-74; Daniel Levinthal, A Survey of Agency Models of
Organizations, 9 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 153-85 (1988).
10. Stephen Bernhut, Sumantra Ghoshal on Leadership, Management and Good Governance, IVEY BUS. J., March/April 2004, at 3, available at http://www.iveybusinessjournal.
com/view_article.asp?intArticle_ID=479.
11. Levinthal, supra note 9, at 185.
12. Eisenhardt, supra note 6, at 59.
13. DANIEL O’LEARY, ENTERPRISE RESOURCE PLANNING SYSTEMS: SYSTEMS, LIFE CYCLE,
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND RISK 3 (Cambridge University Press 2000).
14. Chuck C.H. Law & Eric W. T. Ngai, ERP Systems Adoption: An Exploratory Study
of the Organizational Factors and Impacts of ERP Success, 44 INFO. & MGMT. 419 (2007).
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constitute essential tools in regulating the collection, production, and
flow of information within, around, and out of the firm. The topic of
information gathering and usefulness to BoDs has been discussed in the
past, and prior studies have linked information quality with both information usefulness and decision accuracy, both of which are likely to be
important when considering BoDs’ attempts to reduce information
asymmetry.15
CG REFORMS
There has been an escalation of research interest in CG due to the
crash of technology stocks in the late 1990s and the proliferation of corporate accounting scandals a few years later.16 These scandals have revealed the inefficiency of top management to monitor procedures, leading
to financial losses for stakeholders.17 Consumer activists, institutional
shareholders, and government regulators have advanced proposals to reform corporate boards, notably their structures and processes, thus directing companies to demonstrate sound CG policies and practices. Most
of these initiatives were featured prominently in developed countries
such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy,
and Spain among others.
Regulatory reforms in the U.S., such as SOX, have exerted pressure
in the United Kingdom,18 Germany,19 France,20 Italy,21 and Spain22 for
15. George S. Low & Jakki J. Mohr, Factors Affecting the Use of Information in the
Evaluation of Marketing Communications Productivity, 29 J. ACAD. MKTG. SCI. 70, 75
(2001); O’LEARY, supra note 13, at 8.
16. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 6 (K. Keasey, S. Thompson & M. Wright eds., 1999);
Valter Lazarri, et al., Is Corporate Governance Delivering Value?, 5 EUROPEAN ECON. FORUM 5-27 (2001), available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb4779/is_5/ai_n28892
708/?tag=content;coll; The McKinsey Quarterly, The State of the Corporate Board: A McKinsey Global Survey, http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/The_state_of_the_corporate_
board_2007_A_McKinsey_Global_Survey_2011 (last visited Sept. 12, 2007).
17. See, e.g., Thomas Clarke, Accounting for Enron: Shareholder Value and Stakeholder Interests,13(5) CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L REV. 598-612 (2005); Louis Lavelle, Enron: How Governance Rules Failed, 21 BUS. WK. 289 (2002), available at http://
www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_03/b3766045.htm; A. Parker, The Man Who
Put Auditing First Accounting Regulation: William McDonough, Outgoing Chairman of the
Watchdog Set Up in the Aftermath of the US Corporate Scandals, 1053 FIN. TIMES 17
(2005); Steven T. Petra, Do Outside Independent Directors Strengthen Corporate Boards?, 5
CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L J. OF BUS. IN SOC’Y 55-64 (2005); Caspar Rose, The Composition of Semi-Two-Tier Corporate Boards and Firm Performance, 13 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN
INT’L REV. 691-701 (2005); Willy A. Sussland, The Board of Directors: A Referee or a
Coach?, 5 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT’L J. BUS. SOC’Y 65-72 (2005).
18. ADRIAN CADBURY, THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: REPORT OF
THE COMMITTEE ON THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Gee Publishing
1992), available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cadbury.pdf; RICHARD GREENBURY,
DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION: REPORT OF A STUDY GROUP CHAIRED BY SIR RICHARD GREENBURY (Gee Publishing, July 15, 1995), available at http://www.econsense.de/_CSR_INFO_
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companies to rethink issues regarding governance structures alongside a
firm’s performance. The next two sections summarize the key elements
of two basic recent reforms placing an emphasis on the importance of
Information Systems for compliance with CG principles.
A. CRITICISM

ON

CG PRINCIPLES

The CG principles that apply to information systems concern mainly
privacy, data integrity, systems availability, and delivery of accurate financial reporting. The SOX and the European Union’s 8th Directive specifically demand that boards and senior executives understand IT
implementation and risks. There are certain points of criticism, however, regarding the implementation of SOX and OECD. These are briefly
discussed in the subsequent paragraph:
The reforms impose a complex system of control and monitor over the
corporate system of governance and hence they vitiate financial and
functional efficiency.
They do not provide real time disclosure due to time lag between the
time of the actual event (material or not) to the time of disclosure (via a
report).
Achieving and maintaining compliance can be costly and time consuming, although noncompliance can prove even more costly.23
The firm may not realize the scope and benefits of the legal or other
initiatives.
Too strict legal provisions might affect overall performance. There is no
room for strategic flexibility.
SOX can be used as a pretext to “raise anti-takeover measures that protect incumbent managers and large shareholders.”24

Furthermore, SOX uses terms like material, fairly, timely, officer’s
knowledge, rapid, and current basis. All these terms are vague or at least
are subject to interpretation. Also, there is the problem of aggregation of
POOL/_CORP_GOVERNANCE/images/greenbury_report.pdf; RONNIE HAMPEL, COMMITCORPORATE GOVERNANCE: FINAL REPORT (Gee Publishing 1998), available at http://
www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/hampel_index.htm.
19. CROMME COMMITTEE, GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE (2002), http://www.
corporate-governance-code.de/eng/kodex/1.html.
20. DANIEL BOUTON, PROMOTING BETTER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN LISTED COMPANIES, (2002) http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/rapport_bouton_en.pdf.
21. COMM. FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF LISTED COMPANIES, CODE OF CONDUCT
(1999), available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/code_of_conduct.pdf.
22. The Governance of Listed Companies, SPECIAL COMM. TO CONSIDER A CODE OF ETHICS FOR CO. BD. OF DIR. (Madrid, Feb. 26, 1998).
23. Microsoft, Creating a Systemized Approach to Regulatory Compliance at Microsoft,
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/itshowcase/content/regcompliance.mspx (last visited
Jan. 20, 2007).
24. Alvaro Cuervo, Corporate Governance Mechanism: A Plea for Less Code of Good
Governance and More Market Control, 10 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT’L REV. 84, 84-93 (2002).
TEE ON
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information leading to information loss. Finally, no provision is made for
the channels of information dissemination. Traditional channels of communication with stakeholders, such as annual reports, should be supported by other channels of communication, taking into account the
complexity and globalization of financial markets and the impact of technology25 according to the principle of “equality of disclosure.”26
In light of the foregoing, it seems that information dissemination
and information control are critical in achieving compliance with SOX
and OECD principles. The effort and cost of compliance cannot be justified in terms of financial performance.27 Many of the weaknesses of SOX
and OECD practices, as they were described in the previous paragraph,
can be improved with modern ES. “[A]ccuracy and timeliness of financial
reporting relies heavily on a well-controlled IT environment. In other
words, IT management has suddenly shifted from being an eventual goal
or ‘one of those pesky IT problems’ to being a business requirement.”28
Then why not have IT people participate in the compliance effort?
According to a survey for top Fortune 100 companies, most executives viewed compliance with SOX as a finance issue and they considered
it premature for the Chief Information Officer to be involved.29 In addition, many corporations have not yet begun to address their SOX obligations in a serious way, and are therefore unaware of the critical need for
IT involvement in SOX compliance processes.30 Corporations that do not
consider IT as a valuable component of SOX compliance will find themselves at high risk.31

25. United Nations, Conference on Trade and Development, 2006, Guidance on Good
Practices in Corporate Governance Disclosure, New York and Geneva, available at
www.unctad.org/TEMPLATES/webflyer.asp?docid=7084&intItemID=2068&lang=1.
26. Id.
27. CHRISTIAN LAHTI & RODERICK PETERSON, SARBANES – OXLEY IT COMPLIANCE USING
COBIT AND OPEN SOURCE TOOLS 31-56 (Syngress 2005).
28. HP, HP ITSM AND HP OPENVIEW: AN APPROACH TO ATTAINING SARBANES-OXLEY
COMPLIANCE, (2004), http://h20229.www2.hp.com/regions/americas/initiatives/sarbanes_
oxley_wp.pdf.
29. Ben Worthen, Your Risks and Responsibilities, CIO, May 15, 2003, available at
http://www.cio.com/archive/051503/rules.html; William Brown, W. & Frank Nasuti, F.,
“What ERP systems Can’t Tell Us About Sarbanes-Oxley”, 13 INFO. MGMT. & COMP. SOC’Y,
311, 321 (2005).
30. Lane Leskela & Debra Logan, Sarbanes-Oxley Compliance Demands IS Involvement, GARTNER, 2003, http://www.gartner.com/resources/117800/117873/117873.pdf (last
visited Jan. 4, 2007).
31. ALTIRIS INC., THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT FROM AN IT PERSPECTIVE (2004), http://hosteddocs.ittoolbox.com/altiris010306a.pdf.
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The terms information quality, cost channel form, and time have become parameters of disclosure and transparency. OECD principles use
the term transparency, whereas SOX sections use the word disclosure.32
In 2003, Alan Greenspan distinguished disclosure from transparency
when he stated:
[t]ransparency implies that information allows an understanding of
a firm’s exposures and risks without distortion. The goal of improved
transparency thus represents a higher bar than the goal of improved
disclosures. Transparency challenges market participants not only to
provide information but also to place that information in a context that
makes it meaningful. Moreover, transparency challenges market participants to present information in ways that accurately reflect risks.
Much disclosure currently falls short of these more demanding goals.
Despite the substantial room for progress with regard to transparency,
we should not underestimate the barriers to achieving it. Managers no
doubt have to struggle with selecting and organizing data in a meaningful way.33

Minority shareholders and stakeholders receive information about
the firm’s value and performance mainly through the firm’s financial
statements. Financial reporting grasps only a small number of the economic events that affect the firm (see Figure I). This leaves them with
limited information that can be tampered with by the executive managers and/or the dominant shareholders.

ACCOUNTING
EVENTS
ECONOMIC
EVENTS
INFORMATION
LOSSES

FINANCIAL
REPORTING

INFORMATION
LOSSES

Figure 1: Information Losses Through the Chain of Information
Recording and Reporting (Lazarides and Drimpetas, 2008)

32. OECD Principles, supra note 1.
33. Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Remarks at the 2003 Conference on Bank Structure
and Competition (May 8, 2003), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/oarddocs/
speeches/2003/20030508.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2007).
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Information has become a critical component of good CG. The functions of control, supervision, monitoring, and accountability, which are
closely related with CG, call for an information system that can deliver
information to the controlling parties (shareholders – stakeholders). A
fundamental organizational implication of CG is the creation of a reverse
pyramid (see Figure 2). The reverse pyramid and the classical organizational one, have a common area. The common area is the main field of
power. The non-common area contains the field of monitor, control, and
accountability. Due to the fact that the monitoring, controlling, and accountability areas and the corresponding groups are outside the official
organizational structure they are deprived of information and rely on the
cooperation (trust), tools, and “weapons” provided by laws, regulations,
and internal rules.
Managers are positioned at the top of both pyramids and hence they
are in control of information flow and dissemination; they may have
more than one role in the pyramid. That is why the boundaries between
the BoD and the executive managers are not clear (see Figure 2). CG has
not created a new balance of power, per se, within the firm but a new
power delegation and control mechanism.
STAKEHOLDER, REGULATION BODIES

COMMITTIES
Independent
BoD Members

Non Exec.
BoD Members

CEO,
President

BoD (Executive
Mangers,
Major
Shareholders)

TOP EXECUTIVE MANAGERS

MIDDLE LEVEL MANAGEMENT

LOW LEVEL MANAGEMENT

Figure 2: The Dyadic Role of Executive Managers
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The accumulation of control and monitor layers (not directly linked
to stakeholders) outside the firm does not facilitate information analysis
and process by the main stakeholders and shareholders and hence the
feasibility of control. On the contrary, the accumulation of control and
monitor layers results in organizational turbulence. Stakeholders (other
than the ones that already control information flow within the firm) can
retrieve and use only a certain amount of processed information; they do
not have the means to access the full records and drill down the registered data of the firm’s information system, thereby reducing their
control.
Stakeholders (everyone with a real or psychological ‘stake’ in an organization)34 have reasonable grounds and incentives to ask for compliance with SOX or OECD principles: capital market committees and
general monitoring institutions must be unbiased when they impose
rules and penalties upon those that they monitor. That is why they must
have well-defined guidelines and benchmarks – lines of acceptable and
not acceptable behavior. Investors (institutional or not) and minority
shareholders may also seek for accurate and timely information. Empirical evidence analyzing the relationship between CG and liquidity indicates a tradeoff between monitoring and liquidity.35
In an era where financial results, integrity and accuracy are questioned, transparency and accessibility to information and corporate
knowledge are crucial for raising funds and attracting investors. “The
motivation behind SOX was to restore investors’ trust in the reliability of
financial data that companies publish about themselves, and to mitigate
the risk of false financial statements.”36 That leads to another SOX disadvantage: SOX only takes into account formal contracts, for instance,
financial information or internal control assessment.
It is conventional wisdom that transparency, openness, and full disclosure make for efficient financial markets and exemplary CG as market participants digest the same information at the same time, thereby
causing sharp single direction swings in the market. In spite of this,
Welch and Rotberg question whether full, immediate, and widespread
disclosure of material corporate events will always lead to volatility in
34. Gerald Vinten, Shareholder Versus Stakeholder - Is There a Governance Dilemma?,
9 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT’L REV. 36 (2001).
35. Mike Burkart, Denis Gromb, and Fausto Panunzi, Large Shareholders, Monitoring
and the Value of the Firm, 112 Q. J. ECON. 693 (1997), available at http://www.faculty.
london.edu/dgromb/papers/BurkartGrombPanunzi(QJE1997).pdf; Cuervo, supra note 24,
at 84.
36. P.J. Jakovljevic, Thou Shalt Comply (and More), or Else: Looking at SarbanesOxley, Feb. 21, 2007, http://www.technologyevaluation.com/Research/ResearchHighlights/
ERP/2007/02/research_notes/prn_EV_ER_PJ_02_21_07_1.asp (last visited Jan.5, 2007).
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market reaction by creating a “herd instinct.”37 Nonetheless, this article
argues that shareholders should be the real proprietors of corporate information (financial or other kind of information) and that timely and
accurate information is necessary for investment decisions.
THE SUCCESS OF ES AND GS - A VIEW AHEAD
Many studies regarding ES and CG success have a common element:
the greater percentages of failure cannot be attributed to IT or to IT governance per se, but rather to an inefficient CG system that does not consider the four cornerstones: transparency,38 integrity,39 accountability,40
and efficiency.41 The basic fallacy is that managers and IT specialists
tend to face even sophisticated and complex information systems, like
ES, only with IT terms, and evaluate their implementation and function
only with IT benchmarks. Above all else, ES implementation success involves a change in culture.42
CG and legal regimes may fail. ES and IT governance may fail as
well. The analysis of CG and modern ES shows that there are some synergies or complementarities (the disadvantages of one can be vitiated by
the right usage of the other). There are several gaps in the design and
architecture of the current enterprise system which are necessary in order to meet the requirements of the SOX and OECD. Some possible solutions involve a change in the IT governance, but this is a broad subject
with multiple disciplines: information technology, risk management,
strategy, intellectual property, business design, project management,
compliance, and so on.
A new holistic approach is needed and some new tools must be incorporated in the ES adoption. An innovative enterprise system design is
necessary to incorporate key components of Business Intelligence (“BI”).
37. Theodora C. Welch & Eugene H. Rotberg, Transparency: Panacea or Pandora’s
Box, 25 J. MGMT. DEV. 937, 937-941 (2006).
38. Zabihollah Rezaee, Kingsley Olibe, & George Minmier, Improving corporate governance: the role of audit committee disclosures, 18 MANAGERIAL AUDITING J. 530, 530-537
(2003).
39. Gerry H. Grant, The Evolution of Corporate Governance and Its Impact on Modern
Corporate America, 41 MGMT. DECISION 923, 923-924 (2003), available at http://www.
emeraldinsight.com/Insight/viewPDF.jsp?contentType=Article&Filename=html/Output/
Published/EmeraldFullTextArticle/Pdf/0010410909.pdf.
40. Laura F. Spira, Enterprise and Accountability: Striking a Balance, 39 MGMT. DECISION 739, 739-748 (2001), available at http://www.emeraldinsight.com/Insight/viewPDF.
jsp?contentType=Article&Filename=html/Output/Published/EmeraldFullTextArticle/Pdf/
0010390905.pdf.
41. Gordon Walker & Mark Fox, Corporate Governance Reform in East Asia, 2 CORP.
GOVERNANCE 4, 4-9 (2002).
42. Carl Marnewick & Lessing Labuschagne, A conceptual model for enterprise resource planning (ERP), 13 INFO. MGMT. & COMP. SEC.144, 144-155 (2005).
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BI applications are decision support tools that enable real-time, interactive access, analysis, and manipulation of mission-critical corporate information.43 Users (stakeholders) are able to directly access (without
using mediators that may have conflicting interests with them) and leverage vast amounts of information, to analyze relationships and to understand trends that ultimately support business decisions. These tools
prevent potential loss of knowledge within the enterprise that results
from a massive accumulation of information that is not readily accessible
or in usable form.44 That will be a major challenge, encompassing predictive analytics following a proactive approach to corporate information
governance as well.45
CONTRIBUTION- LIMITATIONS - FUTURE RESEARCH
Consistent with the well established literature, CG principles can be
advantageously implemented with the use of a modern ES. Thus, guaranteeing that the stakeholders who legally or ethically demand information can get it, and that CEOs and managers effectuate their fiduciary
duty as conductors of information through and outside the firm. Information handling is at the core of the problem of CG itself. The constant flow
of quality information, provided by the ES, stabilizes the efficiency of the
CG mechanisms (implicit and explicit contracts, reputation and trust)
and creates a coherent corporate network that reduces conflicts. In turn,
this can ameliorate the implicit conflict between agents and principals.
The new approach provided in this article triggers new concepts
aimed at enhancing the ability of stakeholders to participate in the governance process. It is broader in scope than previous approaches, and
suggests that the design and implementation of ES, according to modern
CG principles and guidelines, can help all parties to make rational decisions (through the power of logic and not through the logic of power) and
to facilitate the market for corporate control. The whole argument, however, is rather new and needs further analysis and empirical testing.
Moreover, no ES can itself promise the success of any corporate endeavor
and undertaking.
ES and CG are both based on cultural change, and culture is based
on knowledge. The modern ES systems are able to store non-structured
information. But how can they exploit this information? Can the modern
43. SearchDataManagement.com, Business Intelligence, http://searchdatamanagement.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid91_gci213571,00.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2009).
44. Marnewick, supra note 42, at 144-155.
45. Mukhles Zaman, Predictive Analytics; the Future of Business Intelligence, TEC
DAILY NEWSLETTER, . 8, 2005, available at http://www.technologyevaluation.com/Research/
ResearchHighlights/BusinessIntelligence/2005/12/research_notes/prn_TU_BI_XMZ_12_24
_05_1.asp, (last visited December 12, 2006).
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ES encapsulate the corporate social and cultural capital? Is it able to
store, explore and potentially create a competitive advantage stemming
from corporate knowledge and culture? Two basic questions remain for
future research: a) who is the proprietor of the information and knowledge, and who has a legitimate right to demand it?; and b) how can anyone, with a legitimate right, obtain this information securely, timely, at a
minimal cost, and in the right format? All these questions are CG questions, and they have been partly addressed in recent CG principles.
Nonetheless, the foregoing analysis reveals that there is there is still
room for further improvement in the implementation of ES and GC
practices.

